June 6, 1969 – June 8, 1969. Operation Hammer/5RAR.

5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (5RAR) operations against the PAVN 1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment Viet Cong, a company from the 33 NVA Regiment and elements of the Viet Cong D440 Provincial Mobile Battalion, at Binh Ba, 5 kilometers (3.1 mi) north of Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy Province. The battle was unusual in Australian combat experience in Vietnam as it involved fierce close-quarter house-to-house fighting, although the majority of enemy killed was through heavy artillery and air-bombardment. In response to communist attempts to capture Binh Ba the Australians assaulted the village with infantry, armour and helicopter gunships, routing the Viet Cong and largely destroying the village itself.

Operation Hammer Personal Account: [225] Back at Nui Dat, between ready reaction tasks, company operations, convoy protection and other operational tasks, 5 RAR were enjoying their 'break'. A Company was in 'Vungers' (Vung Tau) making sure their break was not wasted resting, C and B Companies were involved with training, and D company was Ready Reaction Company on the morning of  6 June. 1 ATF Ready Reaction Company was part of a force which included a Centurion Tank troop and an APC troop. This force was always at thirty minutes notice to react against any major enemy threat to the population centres of Phuoc Tuy province. Binh Ba village some three miles north of Nui Dat base is on Route 2. Its population  of one thousand is made up mainly of farmers and rubber workers of the surrounding Gallia Plantation. Most of the houses of the village are sturdy structures of concrete and tiles. At 0810 hours (8.10.am) a tank and an armoured recovery vehicle moving through to the 6 RAR Fire Support Base further north, were fired on by an RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade) from one of the houses. Initial intelligence said that there were two enemy platoons in the village and consequently the commander 1 ATF decided to deploy the Ready Reaction Force. After briefing, the force was assembled by 1030 hours (10.30.am) just south of Binh Ba. Although the District Chief of the Duc Thanh District had requested 1 ATF assistance, he had not given his clearance as he wanted to satisfy himself that all civilians had been evacuated from the town. Since Binh Ba was in 6 RAR's area of Operations, command of the Ready Reaction Force was initially invested in the CO of 6 RAR. At 1120 hours (11.20.am), when D Company came under heavy RPG fire it was evident that there was more than two platoons in the village and the District Chief did not hesitate in telling the force to "do what you have to do" and stated that he would take responsibility for any damage to the village that might result from the action. At 1200 hours (midday), the CO 5 RAR deployed his tactical headquarters comprising himself, the intelligence officer and two signalers, forward to the district post of Duc Thanh, north of Binh Ba. C Company reacted against another enemy attack against Hoa Long on the south of the Nui Dat perimeter. B Company was also reacted to Binh Ba. The CO 5 RAR was given control of the Binh Ba Battle and placed B Company in a block on the east of the village. D Company had, by this time, fought their way to the centre of the village. The tanks drew heavy RPG  and small arms fire and the enemy were concentrating the efforts against them. The fighting was so fierce and confused for two hours that a detailed description is impossible. The enemy was indeed much stronger than the estimated two platoons. (Captured documents later revealed that the enemy force was the 1st Battalion 33 NVA Regiment, guided by the Binh Ba Guerilla Unit). A light fire team (RAAF Bushrangers) reported enemy movement south and west of the village. After an hour one tank was forced to withdraw west with the other two tanks immobilised by crew casualties. D Company Commander, Major Murray Blake, decided to move the two tanks and APC protection out of the village and move around to the west to conduct another sweep. This was made possible by the Bushrangers containing most of the enemy movement. The tank troop was relieved by another troop. All crew commanders had been wounded and their ammunition had been spent. By 1400 hours (2.00.pm)  the force had formed up west of the village and started their second sweep with infantry leading and the tanks close behind flanked by the APC's. The village was ominously quiet. Contact was made again as the detailed house clearing commenced. The enemy in the houses fired through the doorways and then jumped into underground bunkers built by the inhabitants for use in time of attack. Fortunately these usually had only one entrance. A pattern developed. When the enemy fired on the infantry, the 'Diggers' returned fire until a tank could get into position. The tanks then blew a hole in the concrete wall, put a canister round through the hole then sprayed the area with machine guns. The infantry then cleared the house room by room and then threw grenades into the tunnels. Many face to face confrontations with the enemy occurred inside the houses. Throughout the operation the soldiers showed remarkable courage and control. On several occasions they held their fire and exposed themselves to their front as some civilians were still in the village unable to escape. When fire was directed at them the identity of the occupants of the house was determined. The raw leadership of the soldiers was outstanding. Of the twenty one rifle sections involved, twelve were commanded by private soldiers. Two platoons were led by sergeants and one by a corporal. Some of the civilians being evacuated were found to be enemy soldiers dressed in civilian clothes taken from deserted houses. This sweep stopped at last light with the whole force exhausted after eight hours of continual contact. That night the village was still not secure. C Company killed two enemy trying to break out of the village. At 0600 hours (6.00.am) 7 June, some of B Company blocking in the rubber to the south, noticed a force of company strength moving towards them from the south. Thinking they were friendly PF (Provincial Forces) soldiers, the Australians waved to them upon which the force, in fact NVA, waved back. They probably thought they were rejoining their comrades at Binh Ba. Realisation dawned on both groups at the same time, causing a hasty enemy withdrawal under a torrent of fire from our troops. Action on 7 June was mainly in Duc Trung, a rubber factory some five hundred yards north of Binh Ba. An APC was fired on and a reconnaissance helicopter observed up to eighty enemy were moving between the buildings. The 5RAR Assault Pioneer Platoon was sent from Nui Dat as the PF platoon in Duc Trung held its ground. an RF (Vietnamese Regional Force) Reaction Company from Baria was sent in to clear this village as our Pioneer Platoon blocked to the south. However, the enemy had already departed. Meanwhile at 0950 hours (9.50.am) D Company with a platoon from C Company swept through the western half of Binh Ba from the west. PF forces were blocking enemy escape to the north, B Company and armour were blocking to the south and east. Three prisoners were taken and evacuated. Spasmodic contact only was made with small groups of NVA still in the village. At approximately 1300 hours (1.00.pm) heavy firing again broke out in Duc Trung. The District Chief reported that the PF platoon had been overrun by an estimated one hundred enemy resulting in four PF killed and seven wounded. Artillery was effectively employed to the north-west of Duc Trung and was observed by an air observer to fall in the midst of the enemy and within twenty yards of the houses. Again a Light Fire Team was most effectively employed around this village.

B Company with a tank troop were ordered to sweep Duc Trung. After crossing their start point, the District Chief received word that a number of civilians were still intermingled with the enemy, and the force was halted. As a PF force moved in to do the sweep, the enemy withdrew to the north-east and north-west continually harassed by artillery and Light Fire Teams. At 1500 hours (3.00.pm) D Company continued to clear Binh Ba. That night the companies blocked around both villages. Next morning, 8 June, the action at Binh Ba concluded at 0900 hours (9.00.am), the Australian Civil Affairs arrived at Binh Ba to assist in the resettlement of the villagers. In this vicious battle, a large enemy force was defeated by rapid reaction, skill, courage and fire power. The 'Battle of Binh Ba' ranks as one of the major military victories of the Australian Force in Vietnam. Such battles were not the norm in Phuoc Tuy, however, and the heavy losses suffered by the communists forced them to temporarily leave the province. Operation Hammer concluded by 09:00 on 8 June with one final sweep carried out that morning to ensure that Binh Ba was clear. By this time a large communist force had been defeated by the Australians, and the village practically destroyed. Indeed, Binh Ba was so badly damaged that many of the villagers whose homes were destroyed were subsequently resettled with the help of the 1st Australian Civil Affairs Unit. Although the Australians did encounter communist Main Force units in the years to come, the battle marked the end of such large-scale clashes, and ranks as one of the major Australian victories of the war. Despite efforts to clear the village of civilians before the battle, a large but unknown number of civilians had undoubtedly died during the fighting. This fact, coupled with the one-sided casualty count, later led to claims in the media of an Australian atrocity. One Australian had been killed and 10 wounded, while communist losses included at least 107 killed, six wounded and eight captured. The battle was one of the major victories of the Australians in Vietnam and although they would occasionally encounter communist Main Force units in the future, it effectively marked the end of such large-scale clashes. Indeed, as a result of such heavy losses suffered at Binh Ba the North Vietnamese were temporarily forced to move out of Phuoc Tuy and into the adjoining province of Long Khanh. The Royal Australian Regiment, the 3rd Cavalry Regiment and 1st Armoured Regiment were subsequently awarded the battle honour 'Binh Ba', one of only five presented to Australian units during the war. It ranks as one of the major Australian victories of the war.

Operation Hammer Platoon Commander's Account: [226] The Fifth Battalion had returned to Nui Dat. Between ready reaction tasks, company operations, convoy protection and numerous other operational tasks, the battalion was enjoying a break from full scale operations. A Company was on two days leave in Vung Tau, C and B Companies were involved in training and D Company was the Ready Reaction Company. D Company was enjoying the 'Break' with the opportunity to get a decent nights sleep, wash some clothes, write a letter home and have a hot meal— without the need to be on constant alert against enemy attack. On the morning of the 6th, D Company members were looking forward to another day of moderate activity. Few probably gave thought to the date and the fact that on this day in 1944, the D Day Invasion of Europe was well under way. Binh Ba village situated some two miles north of the Task Force Area and on the western side just off Route 2 and comprised of around one thousand people in population—made up of mainly farmers and rubber plantation workers. The village houses was constructed of solid brick and tile. The village was well known to the Australians during the first tour and 5RAR stationed a rifle company and a mortar section within the village. This strategy proved to be a deterrent to the Viet Cong tax collectors and assassination squads taking control of the village. This however, was not to continue. In 1969 as the drain on the meagre resources of the Battalion proved to be too much and the village was left to the protection of Regional Forces. On separate operations, 6RAR was engaged in a heavy contact with the enemy several miles north of the Task Force Base. On the morning of 6 June 1969 at 0800hrs, a Centurion Tank and an armoured recovery vehicle moving through to assist 6RAR were fired upon from Binh Ba village.The initial intelligence report indicated that two (2) enemy platoons had infiltrated the village and the commander 1 ATF decided to react Delta Company to the village.The Ready Reaction Force (on 30 Minutes notice to move), consisted of D Company 5RAR, a troop of tanks and an APC Troop (Armoured Personnel Carriers) were alerted to the incident and prepared to move to the area. The Officer commanding  D Company issued orders and the force moved off to the village of Binh Ba.The company consisted of 3 platoons (10, 11 and 12 platoons) plus company HQ (From this point on the account of the battle is described by the platoon commander of 10 Platoon)."On receiving the warning order, I mustered my men, in all, 15 plus myself, a medic and a radio operator. The usual platoon strength is 30 plus, so 10 platoon was less than half strength."
"We pulled up just clear of the village. The open ground, cleared of trees some 300 yards from the village perimeter, gave a clear view. From my position, looking out from the open hatch of the APC, I could see a lot of people, 30 or 40 running, as if to take up defensive positions. The next moment, several RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenades) smoke trails were heading in our direction—all I wanted to do was to get out of the APC—one hit from an RPG would kill or wound all those aboard."

With preparation from helicopter gunships, (9 Squadron RAAF) D Company assaulted the village. The formation was an extended line with 10 Platoon Right flank, 11 Platoon and 12 Platoon taking the centre and Left flank positions. Company HQ plus formed the reserve. The centurion tanks were magnificent but they were no match against concealed enemy firing RPG 7's. Within an hour all three tanks were disabled due to damage and crew casualties. The Officer commanding D Company decided to move his force out of the village and move to western side of Binh Ba. With a fresh troop of tanks together with APC support, D Company conducted a second assault on the village. Infantry platoons led the assault; each platoon had one tank and two APCs in close support. The OC, D Company sent a radio message to the platoon commander 10 platoon. "You are not covering your objective, arrange your call sign to do so." I swore at the company commander (under my breath) and decided to break my platoon up into house clearing teams. This meant five teams of two to three men. Platoon HQ would form another team of two, myself and one other. We still had the tank and two APCs but, control of the platoon and the support vehicles would now pose a problem. "The left clearing teams as well as the right clearing teams will move one row of houses forward and remain there. The centre clearing team, myself and the radio operator, will clear the single centre row. I will give the order to move forward and we will do it all over again. If you get into trouble remember we have a tank and two APCs at our rear, get word to me by runner if you need them, any questions?" With this change, the platoon continued the advance. The platoon made contact with the enemy immediately. The opposing force occupied the houses and was firing from the windows, doors and from any available cover. One member of 10 Platoon, Pte Wayne Teeling was shot through the neck as his team approached the first line of houses.  The platoon commander recalls: "Cpl Bamblett and I reached Pte Teeling but he was dead, all we could do was to drag his body out of the line of fire. Once this was done, I made contact with my tank and tried to speak to the commander using the phone at the rear of the vehicle—it wasn't working. Climbing up to the hatch I made contact and directed the vehicle commander to fire one round of H.E. (High Explosive) into the building."

The house exploded and the clearing team assaulted immediately. Six enemy dead were found in the ruins. This type of action was typical all along D Company's assault line. It was made clear some time ago that the strength of the enemy force was far greater than two platoons. It was confirmed from captured documents that D Company was facing elements of the 1st Battalion, 33 NVA Regiment. Enemy weapons littered the battle ground. Some members of 10 platoon used discarded AK47's to conserve their own ammunition. The best laid plans of mice and men rang true in this case. 10 platoon groups were held up by enemy action. For example the platoon commander of 10 platoon confronted two enemy soldiers in one house—his centre clearing task. A brisk exchange of fire resulted in two enemy dead but, he also lost control of the platoon for about 15 minutes while this was going on. The other clearing teams also confronted enemy firing rockets and machinegun fire. 10 platoon teams were getting in front of the other advancing platoons (11 and 12 Platoons). The platoon commander added: "It took me 20 minutes to regain control of the platoon and the lesson here is to lead, not to get involved in a fire fight." On one occasion the left hand groups of 10 platoon were mistaken for the enemy and attracted fire from one of our APCs. To say that the battle, which lasted for two days, was fierce and confusing is an understatement. Elements of the 1st Battalion 33 NVA took up defensive positions within the village and fought to the death. Other groups discarded their uniforms and weapons and mingled with the pockets of civilians unable to escape the fighting. This added another dimension to the conduct of the battle, and the soldiers of D Company 5RAR exposed themselves to extreme danger trying to usher these groups to the rear of the battle zone. Other enemy groups tried to flee the village, or hide in the small air raid bunkers attached to every house. In one case, an enemy force as large as an infantry company attempted to enter the village to take part in the battle. In the latter case these forces were met by B Company, blocking the exit and entry routes outside Binh Ba. To fully clear the village, every bunker, house and any likely areas of concealment had to be searched. In many cases face to face confrontations with the enemy took place as this procedure was being carried out. On the second day, the clearing of the village continued. D Company, with a platoon from B Company did much the same as on day one although, contact with the enemy focused on small groups of NVA (North Vietnamese Army)  still holed up in the village. 10 Platoon came across a woman outside her house, she was in a terrible state, crying and gesturing to a partly collapsed bunker. A brief search by members of 10 Platoon resulted in a young male around 15 years of age, being pulled from the hole. He was in a state of shock but no signs of physical injury. Still crying, the women refused to leave and kept pointing to the bunker. Further searching discovered the body of a young girl; she had been blown in half. We could do little to help the mother apart from wrapping up the body of her dead daughter and assist her and her son to reach a safe area to the rear.

 
G. Johnson wrote "I have seen a sight under heaven that only God understands." The account of this action is given by the platoon commander of 10 Platoon. The intention is to describe the battle at a platoon level and in some areas give an overall view. It is not the intention to minimise or overlook the participation of other elements of 5RAR and supporting units involved in the engagement. The battle was won by the successful co-operation between units and sub units of the Task Force. [226]